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SUPPORT OF MILITARY DEPENDENTS 1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Marriage and its obligations originate in
state law. It has long been recognized, even at com-
mon law that a husband is responsible for supporting
his wife and children. The states have recognized
the right of the wife to sue for support to be speci-
2
fically ordered by a court of civil jurisdiction.
3In addition the states have enacted statutes carrying
criminal sanctions to prod errant husbands to shoulder
their responsibilities in this regard.
1. Military "dependents" are defined by 37 U.S.C.
§231 (g) (1958). The term does not include illegiti-
mate children. However, the military treatment of
court orders in the case of such children is the same
as that afforded other support orders. See e.g ., Navy
publication BUPERSINST No. 1620. 1C, [hereinafter re-
ferred to as BUPERSINST 1620. 1C] para. 6 (31 Oct. 1962)
2. See 27 Am. Jur. Husband and Wife, §401 at page 3
(1940)
.
3. E.G. , Cal. Penal Code §§270-270a; 111. Rev. Stat,




In the Armed Forces the responsibility for
the support of dependents rests with the individual
member. However, the manner in which the member meets
this responsibility is of great concern to the organi-
zation. This concern has given rise to special mone-
tary allowances in consideration of dependents, policy
statements regarding the requirement to support and var-
ious procedures and suggestions for dealing with com-
plaints of nonsupport on an individual basis.
All of this official promulgation and imple-
mentation of suggested procedures results in costly ex-
penditures of manpower. It would be gratifying if the
results of this expenditure were uniformly satisfactory.
However, such is not the case.
The purpose of this discussion is to set forth
some of the special problems the military organizations,
their members, and dependents of members encounter; to
attempt to correlate existing laws and regulations and
to determine a practice which will efficiently serve the
best interests of the military organization, its members




The Problem as it Affects
the Military Organization
A. Administrative Burden
Private employers, for the most part, do not
assume the responsibility, as part of their business
overhead, for counselling employees to meet their per-
sonal obligations. It is not likely that creditors or
dependents of people employed in private enterprise go
directly to the private employer for assistance. Whe-
ther assistance would be forthcoming upon request can-
not be predicted.
Normally, the private employer does not know
whether or not an employee is meeting his personal ob-
ligations until a garnishment is brought against pay
due the employee. The garnishment means some additional
bookkeeping for the employer. He may caution the em-
ployee to avoid a recurrence of the garnishment. Gen-
erally, employers are loathe to keep a man on the pay-
roll when his obligations result in repeated garnishments
It should be granted without any hesitation

that the mission of the Armed Forces, like that of the
private employer, is something other than the oversee-
ing of the personal obligations of their members. Un-
der the principle of sovereign immunity the Armed Forces,
4
of course, are not subject to garnishment proceedings.
Dependents and creditors of Armed Forces personnel readily
make their demands known to the military authorities,
however, when the member is delinquent. They may do
this by direct complaint to the man's commanding officer,
legal officer, chaplain or personnel officer, either per-
sonally or by mail. If this were the only means of ap-
proach employed the service wide administrative burden
of this problem might be reduced by some measure. There
are many instances, though when the direct approach is
not taken, often simply because the dependent does not
know where the serviceman can be located, and sometimes,
it would seem, out of a spiteful attitude which drives
them to stir matters at higher levels. As a result poli-
5
tical figures, officers of other agencies, the Adjutant
4. See Buchanan v. Alexander, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 20
(1846); JAGA 1965/3505 (18 Feb. 1965).
5. E.g . , The Department of Justice. See JAGA 1964/
3500, (25 Feb. 1964)
.

General of the Army, the Chief of Naval Personnel, the
Adjutant General of the Air Force and the Judge Advo-
cates General of the several services are all beseeched
for assistance. In many instances this means that cor-
respondence on the matter must be conducted between
these higher echelons and the level of command where
the member is serving before an adequate response can
be made. Possible solutions are delayed in this manner
and the administrative burden on the Armed Forces is
increased.
B. Loss of Investment by Elimination of Members.
To avoid continuing efforts which produce un-
satisfactory results service regulations establish poli-
cies and provide procedures for elimination of personnel
who are determined to be unfit for further military ser-
6
vice. These regulations are applicable to an individual
who has an established pattern of shirking support of de-
pendents or dishonorable failure to pay just debts.
6. See e.g. , AR 635-203 (3 April 1959) (enlisted men)
AR 635-105 (13 Dec. 1960) (officers); Bureau of Naval




While it is costly to the Armed Forces to
administer counselling and correspondence resulting
from complaints of nonsupport, elimination of recalci-
trant individuals is a drastic measure which involves
the waste of the substantial investment in the training
and maintenance of the member. Under ideal circumstances
it is anticipated that a large percentage of recruits
will pursue a career in the service and thereby mini-
mize the burden of the initial training expense.
C. Maintenance of the Honor of the Armed Forces
Since sovereign immunity precludes garnish-
ment proceedings, why do the Armed Forces concern them-
selves with this matter? Conceivably the pleas for
assistance could be ignored and the dependents left to
their own devices to secure support.
However, the military have always had pride
in being an honorable service and could not entertain
such an attitude. Its members must conduct themselves
honorably in all aspects of their lives lest they bring
discredit upon their service.

An example of the announced policy of the
Armed Forces in this regard is contained in Army re-
gulations :
Support of dependents by members
of the Army involves a serious
responsibility which is of direct
concern to the Army. Failure on
the part of a member to carry out
this responsibility not only re-
flects adversely on the Army as a
whole, but is entirely inconsist-
ent with Army standards of honor.
Any other attitude on the part of the autho-
rities would be likely to encourage people to look upon
the services as a refuge for the individual who wished
to shirk his financial obligations. This would not only
discredit the image of the Armed Forces as an honorable
service but demoralize the general membership of the
organization with the result that efficiency would be
drastically impaired.
Hence, a considerable amount of time, thought
and energy is expended by legal assistance officers, per-
7. Army Regs. No. 600-20, Change No. 7, para. 37a.,
(17 Oct. 1963) . [Army Regulations will hereinafter be
cited as AR] See also BUPERSINST No. 1620. 1C, para. 4a.
(31 Oct. 1962) wherein Navy policy is stated thus: "The
Navy will not be a haven or refuge for personnel who dis-
regard or evade their obligations to their familier..."

sonnel officers and chaplains as well as commanders,
counselling servicemen, encouraging them to carry out
their obligations or if that effort fails, taking steps
to punish the recalcitrant or eliminate him from the
service.
Thus it is recognized that maintenance of the
honorable reputation of the Armed Forces is a costly





Factors Which Give Rise to Nonsupport
Problems in the Military
A. Separation of Personnel from Dependents
Although the United States has become a nation
of people on the move, the serviceman is still probably
at the head of the list for number of geographical re-
locations per career. Rarely is he settled at one duty
station for more than three years. Often he stays for
only two years and occasionally he stays only a year.
Aside from those assignments overseas where he is not
p
permitted to take his family at government expense,
and the situation of the sailor whose ship may have a
home port which is seldom seen by the crew, the mere
fact of transfer may require a temporary separation
from family while adequate housing at the new location
is being sought.
8. Joint Travel Regs, for the Uniformed Services para
7000-14 as read with para. 4300-2, item 4.

These separations lead in some cases to
neglect of responsibility on the part of the service-
man. In some instances real or imagined infidelity of
the dependent wife during these separations prompts the
serviceman to cut her off at the pocketbook.
When domestic discord occurs during these
separations reconciliation of the couple is rendered
much more difficult and resolution of support problems
by long distance correspondence is a tedious task at
best. Aside from other considerations, a commander to
whom a complaint of this nature is submitted cannot
readily evaluate the situation, including physical con-
ditions which would indicate what might be adequate sup-
port for the dependent.
The amount of the serviceman's support obli-
gation may be fixed by agreement between the parties.
This is a much desired solution. However, particularly
when the serviceman and his dependents are separated,
this result is often reached only through patient med-
iation conducted by an officer of the service in con-




B. Absence of civil Enforcement of Obligations
The separation of the serviceman from his
dependents, more often than not, puts him in a state
other than that in which his dependents are living.
Add this factor to a popular misconception that a
serviceman is immune from civil process because of the
Soldiers and Sailor's Civil Relief Act and the result
is the over abundance of correspondence referred to
earlier. These claims can be adjudicated in a court
of civil jurisdiction. But the Armed Forces cannot
9. See AR 600-20, Change No. 7, para. 36 (17 Oct.
1963) .
10. 54 Stat. 1173 (1940), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App.
§§ 501-43, 560-90 (Supp. v 1963) . Mere membership in
the Armed Forces does not prevent civil suit for non-
support. See Luckes v. Luckes, 245 Minn. 141, 71 N.W.
2d 350 (1955) where Minnesota Supreme Court held that
trial court action denying defendent's motion for stay
of divorce proceedings based on the Act was not abuse
of discretion, where there was a basis for a justifiable
inference that military service did not materially affect
his ability to conduct his defense.
11. No realistic estimate can be made of the number
of nonsupport or inadequate support complaints received
by the services annually because records are not compiled
to isolate this particular problem.
11





As a practical matter, the service of pro-
cess upon a serviceman is sometimes extremely difficult.
For example, there is a case concerned with an attempt
to bring a putative father action against a soldier who
had been stationed in Alabama when a child was conceived
there. Before action was started the soldier was trans-
ferred to Europe in the ordinary course of Army business,
14and was beyond the jurisdiction of the Alabama court.
12. Cf
.
Snyder v. Buck, 75 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1948).
Upon decease of an officer, the Navy determined that a
Mexican divorce was invalid and thus a purported sub-
sequent marriage invalid and purported widow not en-
titled to death gratuity. Court held "As a matter of
policy it does not appear appropriate that an adminis-
trative agency of the Government should delve and dig
in family skeletons in an endeavor to upset a marriage
openly celebrated and apparently valid on its face, and
which is deemed lawful by the parties thereto in their
lifetime." But cf. U.S. v. Robson, 154 F. Supp. SO (N.D.
Ohio 1953) for proposition that determination of depen-
dency by the Secretary of the Department shall be final
and conclusive, not subject to review except for fraud
or gross negligence, (citing 37 U.S.C. § 252)
13. JAGA 1964/4454 (9 Sept. 1954).
14. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws §47, comment c,
§ 30, comment a. (1934).
12

The opinion of The Judge Advocate General of
the Army in that case contained the following:
The assignment of members of the
military is based upon considera-
tions of military necessity. Acc-
ordingly, it is contrary to the
general policy of the Department
of the Army to transfer a member
from one station to another for
the sole purpose of making him
amenable to civilian legal pro-
ceedings. 15
But service abroad is not the only factor,
which in practical effect, puts the serviceman beyond
the jurisdiction of the civil authorities. If he is not
in some cases totally beyond the civil jurisdiction of
the courts, there are at least circumstances which make
the exercise of jurisdiction exceptionally difficult.
For example, note the following excerpts from an opinion
of The Judge Advocate General of the Army.
"...There is no Federal statute
providing for service of civil
process by military personnel in
their official capacity..."
15. JAGA 1964/4454 (9 Sept. 1964)
13

"...The State of Kentucky.
. .ceded
to the United States exclusive jur-
isdiction over virtually all of the
Fort Knox Military Reservation, re-
serving no authority to serve pro-
cess thereon. Under Kentucky law,
State officials have no authority
to serve process (in their official
capacities) on that part of the re-
servation. . . "
"...Army commanders lack authority
to make their personnel available
for service off the post..." 16
Thus if the state has not reserved the right
to serve process on an exclusive military reservation
its officials have no official authority to serve civil
process thereon. It has heen considered proper for a
military commander to cooperate with state authorities
for service of process if the state has retained the
17fight to serve process. This facilitates maintenance
of order upon the post.
When the dependent is left in one state while
the military member is stationed in another the matter
of obtaining a court order requires interstate cooperation.
13
16. JAGA 1964/3500 (25 Feb. 1961).
17. See AR 27-5 para. 5 (14 Jan. 1960); U.S. Dept.
of the Navy, Judge Adv. Gen. Manual, Article 1310.
13. The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
will be dealt with in some detail infra.
14

In general the problems here are not particularly dif-
ferent than they are with regard to the general public.
The fact that the prospective defendant is in the mili-
tary, however, may dissuade the state where he is stat-
ioned from pursuing the matter. Furthermore, the even-
tual transfer of the serviceman will very likely put
him in a state other than the one where the order was
. . 19
originally obtained. These factors, plus the expense
of litigation tend to discourage the dependent from
seeking a court order. This again leaves the military
official with an unliquidated and unadjudicated claim
to investigate.
The fact that the United States Armed Forces
have personnel stationed throughout the world, further
complicates the problem of effectively enforcing the
obligation to support dependents. Even a properly ob-
tained court order may prove to be of little value to
the dependent if the serviceman subsequently is trans-
19. See Comment, Domestic Relations-Conflict of Laws -
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act , 47 Iowa
L.Rev. 177 (1962) for analysis of problem arising where
application of the act is sought after both parties have
moved from state where support decree has been obtained.
15

ferred abroad. Many nations which would entertain
suit upon a foreign judgment may require reciprocity
with the jurisdiction where the foreign judgment was
20issued. Although some states in the union provide
by statute21 for recognition of judgments of foreign
countries / this is not generally the case. Therefore
there is a hiatus in the judicial enforcement machinery
available.
C. Conflicting Court Orders
Another problem, not entirely peculiar to
the military, but which confuses the issue of support
entitlement, is the frequency of conflicting court de-
crees regarding a member, issued by courts in two or
more jurisdictions. The nomadic aspects of the service-
man's career amplifies this problem by confusing the
issue of domicile and lending impetus to people from
diverse states marrying.
20. See e.g. , Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforce-
ment) Act, 1933, 23 Geo. 5, c. 13; Denmark Law on Ad-




Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1915.
16.

The question of conflicting judg-
ments is an exception to the gen-
eral military policy that judg-
ments valid on their face will be
regarded as binding. 22
The exception is designed to free the military
of the responsibility of choosing amongst conflicting
decrees, not to absolve the member of responsibility
23to support dependents.
A situation not atypical in this regard is
contained in a report of an opinion of The Judge Advo-
24
cate General of the Army. No conflict was found in
the decrees but the facts point up the problem. A
soldier filed a petition for divorce in Louisiana,
then neglected the suit. Later he filed a petition
for divorce in Texas and his wife apparently was served
but did not appear. The Texas court granted the divorce
and provided for support of one named child in the amount
of $77.10 per month. Thereupon, the wife "reopened" the
Louisiana case and gained a divorce and child support
of $136.90 per month for three named children. The
22. JAGA 1964/4143 (29 Jan. 1964). See also JAG
1342:l:sh 109500 (14 Nov. 1957). But see JAGA 1963/
4257 (13 July 1963) (The determination authority may
be exercised in the case of conflicting decrees.)
23. See JAGA 1964/4143 (29 Jan. 1964).
24. JAGA 1964/4457 (31 Aug. 1964).
17

soldier disclaims paternity as to two of the children
but the Louisiana court by implication found paternity
and the Texas court did not litigate the issue. Thus
The Judge Advocate General considered that there was
no conflict of decrees and the soldier should honor
the Louisiana decree unless and until the issue of pat-
ernity is further adjudicated.
It can readily be seen that a conflict would
have existed if all three children had been directly
dealt with in both decrees, but for varying amounts of
support. Such situations are not uncommon.
Another recurring situation is the decree
of a court in one jurisdiction declaring the divorce
granted in another jurisdiction a nullity and ordering
25
support. This problem is often aggravated because
prior to the appearance of the second decree the ser-
26
viceman has entered into marriage with another woman.
By that time the second union may have resulted in minor
dependents, adding to an already complicated situation.
25. See e.g. , JAGA 1963/3620 (21 Feb. 1963) which
deals with case in which California court declared Puerto
Rico divorce a nullity and entered support order in favor
of wife.





D. Military Organization Lacks Authority to Enforce
a Civil Court Order
The dependent who has obtained a court decree
ordering support may not have seen the last of her sup-
port enforcement problems, nor for that matter, the first
of her support payments. The Armed Forces are without
general legal authority to require the members to make
payments for persons they are obligated to support,
even though such obligations have heen reduced to judg-
ment. Such matters are within the exclusive jurisdict-
27ion of the appropriate civil court.
Imagine the frustration, however momentary,
of the wife who has gained a court decree for specific
support, when she is met Dy the Armed Forces official
position as stated thus:
The Department of the Army has no
authority to determine your entit-
lement to support or to enforce a
support decree, as such authority
is exclusively within the juris-
diction of the civil authorities.
However, Army members are subject
to the usual civil enforcement
procedures to enforce support pay-
ments. Therefore, it is suggested
that you seek enforcement of your
supoort decree in the appropriate
civil court. u
27. See JAGA 1963/4343 (15 Oct. 1963)
23. JAGA 1964/3550 (6 March 1964).
19

Her frustration is shared by the officers
of the Armed Forces charged with the responsibility
of administering these problems. It is to the advan-
tage of the services to have its members discharge
their private obligations in an orderly and honorable
manner without forcing creditors and dependents to
exhaust their judicial remedies. In the course of,
or in lieu of the judicial remedies available, the
individual all too often engages the intervention of
multiple high echelon Government personnel, as mentioned
earlier, thereby increasing the administrative work
load of the Armed Forces.
This alternative approach does intensify the
discreditable aspect of the member's failure to meet
his obligations. It may well ultimately lead to his dis-
charge for unfitness, just as surely as failing to heed
the court order. But it does not result in the depend-
ent receiving any support payments unless the pressure of
this activity brings about a "voluntary" payment by the
member, because the Department of the Army has no auth-
ority to direct payment, as for instance by Class E Allot-
ment.
29. See JAGA 1964/3923 (11 May 1964)
20

E. Absence of Mandatory Allotments in Cases of Personnel
of the Fourth Enlisted Pay Grade with over Four Years
Service and their Seniors
.
It is recognized that many of the aspects of
demands for support and difficulties involved are not
unique to the dependents of servicemen. The fact that
the military organization (employer) takes such an active
interest in seeing that these support obligations are
met, does however pose some peculiar problems for that
organization.
The problem has increased to a considerable
degree since January 1, 1963, the effective date of an
amendment to the Career Compensation Act of 1949.
This amendment eliminated the requirement of a Class
Q allotment for dependents of the E-4 with over four
years service and those in senior enlisted pay grades.
The quarters allowance is now paid directly to those
members. Prior to the amendment the Act provided that
30. Act of July 10, 1962, § 3, 76 Stat. 152.
31. Ch. 681, 63 Stat. 304 (1949) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 37 U.S.C.)
21

allotments, to consist of the allowance and a certain
amount of the enlisted man's basic pay, be initiated
in favor of a dependent as a prerequisite to obtaining
32
the allowance. Since the amendment this prerequisite
obtains only with the men in the lower enlisted grades.
Payment directly to the enlisted member is
33
not a new concept. Since 1922 when rental allowances
somewhat akin to those presently granted were provided,
enlisted quarters allowance has been paid directly to
the man concerned except during World War II under the
34Servicemen's Dependent's Allowance Act and since the
Korean emergency under the Dependent's Assistance Act
35
of 1950 which provided for payment to the dependents.
36
The recent amendment was prompted by the con-
sideration that, since these personnel are by and large
mature people and charged with considerable military
32. Act of Sept. 8, 1950, c. 922, § 4(h), 64 Stat.
794 (1950)
.
33. Act of June 10, 1922, ch. 212, 42 Stat. 625 (1922)
34. Act of June 23, 1942, ch. 443, tit. I, 56 Stat.
331 (1942)
35. Act of Sept. 3, 1950, ch. 922, 64 Stat. 794 (1950)
(codified in scattered sections of 37 U.S.C.)
.




responsibility, they ought to be allowed the dignity
of managing their personal affairs. This attitude is
indeed warranted. These individuals for the most part
carry out their obligations and create no cause for con-
cern by the military organization.
Inevitably though, and perhaps as a result
of long years of having the family income split by the
government, thereby automatically relieving the man of
some of his responsibility and casting it upon his wife,
some of these individuals began mismanaging their new-
found "wealth" . In other cases the husband and wife
were already separated when the change was made and the
serviceman took advantage of it to discomfit his es-
tranged spouse.
Surely the practice of requiring an allotment
directly to the wife or to the guardian of minor depen-
dents alleviated or precluded much of the problem for
the military organization. In separate maintenance and
divorce actions the courts tended to rely upon the prac-
tice in setting the amount of support. For example, one
court provided that the father "procure an allotment for
23

his minor child in the amount provided by the U. S.
Government but in no way to be in an amount of less
37
tnan Forty and no/100 ($40.00) per month" Other
courts, while not referring to government allotments
in so many words, were aware of the current amounts
available and specifically order that amount to be
paid. 38
Although the mandatory Class Q allotment
system avoided a great proportion of the problem for
the military organization, it is not suggested that
the general membership of the enlisted ranks again be
subjected to the mandatory system merely to control the
few recalcitrants. Such a move would no doubt be a de-
pressing morale factor for a group of people upon whom
the nation must rely for responsible conduct in the
maintenance of our position in world affairs.
37. This language found in a decree of the Circuit Court
of Tuscaloosa County, Alabama is quoted in JAGA 1964/4512
( 3 Sept. 1964) . This language backfired when the Class Q
allotments were discontinued for senior enlisted men and
the individual was deemed liable for only $40.00 per month
although the "allowance" available might be more.
33. E.g ., JAGA 1964/4457 (31 Aug. 1964) discusses a
support order of a Texas court in the amount of $77.10,
the allowance provided for one dependent, and another
support order of a Louisiana court in the amount of the
allowance provided for three or more dependents plus the
assessment of the enlisted man's basic pay applicable on
the dates of the orders.

CHAPTER IV
Measures Available to Civilian Authorities
for Enforcing Support Requirements
A. Court Orders Generally
The basic method of enforcing a support ob-
ligation is by court order. Presently in the United
States this may be accomplished in one of three ways.
First, if both the petitioner and the alleged
obligor are within the jurisdiction of the appropriate
court enforcement can be effected in a rather direct
manner by resort to that court in accordance with the
39
applicable statute. These statutes provide that tne
dependent may bring action for nonsupport and the court
order the responsible party to make payments of a deter-
mined amount dependent upon tne circumstances.
39. E.G., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209, §32 (1964); Mich.





3. Interstate Enforcement of Judgments.
40
If, subsequent to a judgment, the obligor
leaves the jurisdiction of the court and goes to another
state, action may be brought upon that judgment in the
41
second state. The full faith and credit clause" has
the unifying purpose of giving nationwide effect to
42
rights judicially established in any part of the nation.
Congress has provided the guide lines for introducing
and accepting these judgments in the various states,
territories and possessions of the United States by a
43
simple form of authentication.
In the sense that a support order may be
modified upon change of circumstances, it is a non-final
judgment and as a result there has been some contention
that the full faith and credit clause does not apply.
3ut Mr. Justice Jackson has said:
40. This segment of the discussion presumes personal
jurisdiction over the serviceman or resjudicata of the
issue of jurisdiction in the original court action, Estin
v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
41. U.S. Const. Art. IV § 1
.
42. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430
(1943) .
43. See 23 U.S.C. § 1733 (1953).
26

Where there is a choice under
the full faith and credit clause,
the one should be made.
. .which
will best meet the needs of an
expanding national society for a
modern system of administering
inexpensively and expeditiously,
a more certain justice. 44
Courts apply this principle by enforcing the
45foreign support decree in spite of its lack of finality.
They do take cognizance of the non-final nature by allow-
ing the obligor to show change of circumstances which
46
may influence the court to modify the order.
C. Uniform Reciprocial Enforcement of Support Obligations
,
If the husband and/or father is not in the
state with the dependent when court action is originally
sought, there now is a procedure available which obviates
the necessity of physically pursuing the man from state to
state. The National Conference on Uniform State Laws
44
.
Jackson, Full Faith and Credit- The Lawyer's
Clause of the Constitution , 45 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 24 (1945)
45. See e.g. , Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465,
233 P. 2d 19 (1955); Ostrander v. Ostrander, 190 Minn.
547, 252 N.VJ. 449 (1934); Cosineau v. Cosineau, 155 Ore.
134, 63 P. 2d 397 (1936)
.




approved the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act in 1950. Presently all fifty states, the District
of Columbia and the Virgin Islands have reciprocal acts.
With regard to the availability of this pro-
cedure, the dependent of a military member may have an
advantage over the general public. Unlike some other
agencies, the Armed Forces will not hesitate to reveal
the location of a member to a dependent in this situa-
tion. When this mundane information is available, the
court to which the dependent applies (the initiating court)
can readily send the petition to the appropriate res-
ponding state. Whether the matter is further developed
is dependent entirely upon the responding state since
the language of the act does not contain an offer or an
agreement to do anything. If the responding state is
willing to proceed, the duties of support enforceable
47. The text of the act may be found in Uniform Laws
Annotated Vol. 9C (Supp. V 1963).
48. New York has not adopted the Uniform Act as such,
but has legislation "substantially similar", so recip-





are various, depending on whether Part III § 7 "Choice
of Lav;" of the Uniform Act has oeen adopted verbatim
49
or altered by the state.
Briefly, the Uniform Act provides in the
case where the petition is contested, that the witnesses
be heard by written interrogatories and cross-interro-
gatories. This system provides due process without
undue expense
.
Where exclusive Federal jurisdiction presents
a barrier to the service of civil process, consideration
can be given to invoking criminal proceedings as pro-
50
vided by the Uniform Act. There is statutory authority
for the military to make members available for criminal
51
proceedings. The Uniform Act then provides for holding
49. Uniform Laws Annotated Vol. 9C, p. 27, indicates
states which have preempted the choice of law. See
Ehrengweig, Interstate Recognition of Support Duties ,
42 Calif. L. Rev. 3J2, (1954) for discussion of the
problems and equities involved in the choice of law.
50. Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
§ 5.
51. See 10 U.S.C. § 814(a) (1953).
29

criminal proceedings in abeyance if the support sought
is provided.
D. International Enforcement of Support Obligations
.
The problem of international enforcement of
judgments and support obligations generally, is not a
new one. This area of concern has been Ifhe subject of
international meetings at least since the government of
the Netherlands proposed a conference in 1874. The United
States has been put at a disadvantage in the matter of
international agreement in this area by two aspects of
the federal system of government which we employ. On
the one hand the states of the union are prohibited by
53
the Constitution from entering into a treaty. On the
other hand it has heen left to the states to regulate
marriages, the dissolution of same, and obligations to
support dependents. Because of this second aspect the
United States officials dealing on the international
scene have declined to accept proposals of treaties con-
templating enforcement of judgments or uniform legislation,
52. See Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act §6
53. U.S. Const. Art. I §10.
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This position is maintained in spite of the fact that
the Supreme Court has held that the treaty making power
of the United States is an independent power of the
President (with the advice and consent of the Senate)
and need not be read in conjunction with the other
54
powers of the congress.
It is true that the treaty making power was
intended to relate to external relations and not to make
laws for the people of the United States in their inter-
nal concerns. Thus the State Department might well hesi-
tate, from the standpoint of internal political considera-
tions, to undertake the responsibility of requiring the
individual states to cooperate on a fixed basis with the
courts of other nations.
Other nations have entered into discussions
with a vigor calculated to arrive at a workable solu-
tion. The International Institute for the Unification
54. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1919). Geo-
frey v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 253 (1399); Ware v. Hylton, 3




of Private Law, Rome, which has drafted a Convention for
the Execution Abroad of Maintenance Obligations, has at
least forty members in Europe, Latin America, the Near
55
and Far East. The proposals published on the subject
closely approximate the procedural system set out in
56
the American Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.
Judgments of foreign nations may be enforced
in some countries directly, after registration in the
57
appropriate court, or indirectly upon initiating new
proceedings in the appropriate court and alleging the
foreign judgment as a cause of action. In any case,
the jurisdiction of the court rendering the foreign
judgment is open to attack and the claimant under the
55. Nadelmann, Unification of Frivate Law 29 Tulane
L. Rev. 323 (1955) .
56. See Contini, International Enforcement of Main-
tenance Obligations , 41 Calif. L. Rev. 103 (1953) for discussion
of a series of drafts published by the Rome Institute and
U.N. Committees, urging international settlement of this
problem.
57. See e.g. , Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforce-
ment) Act, 1933, 23 Geo. 5, c 13.
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judgment must sustain the burden upon challenge or the
53judgment is of no avail in the new court. The fact
that maintenance orders call for periodic payments and
may be subject to change in the original forum raises
the same problem in international administration as it
.... . 59does witnin tne United States.
After VZorld War II the British Courts believed/
with some justification, that British maintenance orders
60
would not be enforced in courts in the United States.
This belief would make it difficult to get enforcement
abroad of United States maintenance orders. Although
some states do not provide by statute for the recipro-
city which may be required to give effect to their judg-
61
ments abroad, their courts provide recognition of foreign
judgments on the basis of comity, and some do so ex-
53. See ejg. , Emanuel v. Symon, 1 X.3. 302 (1903) .
59. See e.g. , Harrop v. Harrop, 3 K.B. 336 (1920)
.
60. Cutteridge, The International Enforcement of
Maintenance Orders , 2 Int. L.Q. 155 (1948).
61. See Notes 21 and 22 supra and accompanying text.
32. See e.g. , Caruso v. Caruso, 105 N.J. Eq. 130,
143 Atl. 332 (1930) (N.J. court gave effect to Italian
Court distribution decree although it was not as gen-
erous to minor heir as the New Jersey statute would be.)





pressly without concern for reciprocity. However,
the question of jurisdiction is examined and the public
policy of the forum must not be overridden by the exis-
64
tence of the foreign judgment.
The uncertainty involved and the expense of
pursuing the errant provider on an international trail
65is discouraging. That the problem is of great inter-
est and concern to the American legal profession cannot
66
be doubted. Perhaps the increasing tempo of the trend
in the direction of national protection of individual
67interests in areas previously left to the states will
make itself felt with this problem so that we may see a
63. See e.g. , Gould v. Gould, 235 N.Y. 14, 133 N.S.
490 (1923).
64. See e.g. , Parker v. Parker, 155 Fla. 635, 21 So.
2d 141 (1945) ; Christopher v. Christopher, 198 Ga. 361,
31 S.E. 2d 313 (1944)
.
65. See Contini, International Enforcement of Mainten -
ance Obligations , 41 Calif. L. Rev. 105 (1953) for discuss-
ion of the difficulty and expense for a dependent to retain
counsel in foreign countries and the requirement for the
foreign in many cases to post security for the costs of the
proceedings
.
66. See The Report of the American Bar Association,
Special committee on International Unification of Private
Law, 1961. (urging participation of the United States in
an international scheme)
.
67. See e.g. , The Civil Rights Act of 1954, 73 Stat.
241 (1964).

reversal of the State Department position mentioned
63
earlier.




Efforts of the Military to meet the Problem
A. Monetary Allowances in Consideration of Dependents .
The Armed Forces are acutely aware of the
69
serviceman's obligation to support his family.
Special monetary allowances are available for those
servicemen who have dependents . The amount of the
allowance to enlisted men varies with pay grade and
number of dependents. For the three low enlisted pay
grades the allowances vary depending on whether the man
has one dependent, two dependents or more than two de-
pendents. For the higher enlisted pay grades the allow-
ances vary depending on whether the man has more than
two dependents or not more than two dependents. The
amount of the allowance for dependents of officers var-
70
ies only with the pay grade of the officer. The allow-
69. See e.g. , AR 600-20, Change 7, para. 37a. (17 Oct.
1963); BUPERSINST 1620. 1C, para 4a. Both express the pol-
icy expectation that personnel provide adequate and con-
tinuous support for their dependents.
70. See The Career Compensation Act of 1949, 37 U.S.C.
§ 252(f), as amended by §1, 76 Stat. 152 (1962).
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ance is conditioned upon actual support of the de-
pendent. If the dependent is not receiving support
from the serviceman steps can be taken to discontinue
71
the allowance.
Congress provides that the Secretary of
each service prescribe regulations concerning entitle-
72
ment to allowances in consideration of dependents.
7 3 74
Tne Army and the Navy nave provided for the Chief of
Finance and the Officer in Charge, U.S. Navy Family
Allowance Activity, respectively, to determine depend-
ency qualification. This qualification is determined
by documentation such as marriage certificates, birth
certificates and court orders. An established status
is presumed to continue until legal proof is brought
75
to show otherwise.
The statutory definition of "dependent" in-
cludes all unmarried legitimate minor children of ser-
71. See AR 500-20 Change No. 7, para. 37b. (17 Oct. 1963)
72. See 37 U.S.C. § 252 (i) (1953).
73. AR 37-104, subpara. 5-32 (2 Dec. 1957) with Changes
1-73.
74. See U.S. Dept. of the Navy, Compt. Gen. Manual para.
044039.
75. See JAGA 1964/4685 (15 Oct. 1964).

vicemen (with the exception of those children entitled
to receive basic pay for duty in the uniformed services)
.
7 ^
However, the present implementing regulations do not
treat a child as a dependent if a court order has speci-
fically absolved the serviceman-father of responsibility
for the support of the child. To delete a child from the
category of military dependent the decree must declare
that the support responsibility for the child does not
lie with tne serviceman. The Armed Forces will not treat
a decree which is silent with regard to support obligation
77
as having this effect.
B. Policy and Administrative Measures Designed to Assure
Adequate Support for Dependents .
As previously stated, the Armed Forces have no
jurisdiction to enforce a civilian court order or other-
73
wise order the payment of support. However the organi-
zation does concern itself with the questionable value to
76. 37 U.3.C. § 231 (g) (1953).
77. See e.g. , AR 600-20, Change No. 7 para. 37_c.
(17 Oct. 1963); 3UPERSINST 1620. 1C para. 4b. (2)e. (31
Oct. 1963) .
73. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
.

the service of one who dishonorably evades his lawful
obligation, thus casting discredit upon the Armed
79Forces. "Irresponsibility by members in these matters
30
will not be condoned."
The Navy position as stated in its published
policy regarding support of dependents acknowledges that
"what is adequate or reasonably sufficient support is a
highly complex and individual matter dependent on numerous
factors , and may be permanently resolved only in the
31
civil courts." However, the same instruction sets
forth a support guide for those cases where support has
not been fixed by court order or agreement between the
32 ...parties concerned. The support guide specifies a per-
centage of the member's gross pay (basic pay, special pay
and allowances) as guidance in determining the support to
be provided. The percentage is based upon the relationship
to the member (wife or child) and the number of dependents
involved.
79. See JAGA 1953/4522 (13 Aug. 1953).
80. AR 600-20, para. 37 (3 July 1952). (Now superceded
by Change No. 7, (17 Oct. 1953) where the language is dif-
ferent but the attitude expressed is not.)
31. BUPERSINST 1520. 1C para. 4b.
32. BUPERSINST 1520. 1C para. 4b. (1).
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Upon receipt of complaints the command con-
cerned interviews the member and thoroughly explains
the Navy policy on the matter. The relevant facts are
explored informally as far as possible. A court order
or an agreement between the parties will fix the amount
of support the member is expected to contribute.
In the absence of an agreement or court order
the above-mentioned policy guidance is urged upon the
member. The member is informed that his naval career
may be in jeopardy if he does not take satisfactory ac-
33
tion.
If repeated justified complaints are received
in the case of enlisted members a special mark in mili-
tary behavior is placed in his service-record reflecting
that he is "Unreliable due to unsatisfactory conduct of
34personal affairs and support of dependents." These
entries, made for each succeeding 90-day period until
the situation improves to the satisfaction of the com-
33. BUPERSINST 1620. 1C para. 5cr5d.
84. BUPERSINST 1620. 1C para. 5c. (2).
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manding officer, are the first step toward an admin-
istrative discharge. A second consecutive entry re-
quires a report to the Chief of Naval Personnel with a
recommendation as co disposition or the memoer. If
a discharge is recommended it is done in accordance with
the Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, Article C-10311.
V7hen a command receives an allegation that a
Naval officer is failing to support dependents the
officer concerned is required to give a written statement
of his position and intentions. This statement should
include the amount and method of contribution to de-
pendents during the preceding twelve months, the amount
being contributed monthly at the time the complaint is
received, amount and method of future payments, an ex-
planation of any deviation from the percentage guideline
set forth in Navy policy and any further pertinent infor-
mation which the officer desires to bring to the attention
of the Chief of Naval Personnel. Discreditable conduct
on the part of such officer may be dealt with by notation




trial by court martial or imposition of commanding
orficer's non-judicial punishment.
The Army does not set forth such specific
guidelines for determining adequacy of support where
court orders and mutual agreement are absent. The Army
considered adopting the Navy guideline but decided
against it, although The Judge Advocate General of the
Army recommended that a guideline such as this be adopted
87
as an initial rough guide in determining adequacy of support.
The Army guideline for determining adequacy
in the absence of court order or agreement is quite
general in terminology. It advises the commander to
take into account the military pay of the member, other
sources of income of either the member or the dependent,
the cost of necessities and ordinary living expenses and
other outstanding financial obligations of the member.
All of these general check points should be considered in
B8
evaluating the adequacy of support. Provision is made
36. BUPERSINST 1620. 1C para. 5c.
37. JAGA 1953/3573 (13 Feb. 1963).
38. AR 600-20, Change No. 7, para. 37c_. , (17 Oct. 1963).
42

for counselling the member and for elimination from the
army of a member who does not make satisfactory com-
pliance witn policy.
The Army does not provide for special service
record entries to reflect unsatisfactory conduct in this
matter. It is probable that Naval commands do not im-
plement this procedure as readily as they might. Hesitancy
to implement elimination procedures may be explained by a
two-fold consideration. First there is a reluctance to
summarily eliminate a member who might, in other respects,
be performing well. Secondly, there is the realization
that eliminating the member from the service is hardly a
satisfactory solution for the needy dependent. Therefore,
the drastic last resort of the military organization is
neglected in favor of efforts by the organization to en-
courage satisfactory performance of obligations.
Thus, the recalcitrant member may believe that
he is not going to be abruptly eliminated from the service,
However, he is aware that he must make progress toward sat-
isfactory resolution of his personal affairs or ruin his
military career.
89. AR 500-20, Change No. 7, para. 37g_. , (17 Oct. 1933)
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In the course of counselling the member regard-
ing his obligation it should be brought to his attention
that the quarters allowance is granted in consideration
of his having dependents. If his dependents are not re-
ceiving support from him steps can be taken to discontin-
90
ue his quarters allowance. With that prospect in mind,
the member should realize that he will not gain a wind-
fall by neglecting his dependents. He may then readily
comply with requirements.
Where there is no court order the military
may waive the support requirement for a wife (but not
children) on the basis of adequate evidence of desertion
91
without cause or infidelity on the part of the wife.
This is undoubtedly a good morale factor. The service-
man who can prove misdeeds of the above nature by his
wife should not be obligated to make provision for her.
On the other hand the children are still protected.
The dependent of the military member does have
an advantage over the dependent of a non-military man.
90.- See AR 600-20 Change No. 7, para. 37b. (17 Oct. 1953)
91. See e.g. , BUPERIN5T 1620. 1C, para. 5c. (1)
.

The influence of military policy in this matter is ex-
ercised, in the case of a court order, no matter whether
the member is presently within the jurisdiction of the
court which issued the order. The influence is applied
equally if there has been a mutual agreement executed
between the parties. The influence, based on considera-
tions previously discussed, is applied in the absence
of either court order or mutual agreement.
So, wherever in the world a member may be
when allegations of nonsupport arise against him, upon
determination by the military that a dependency exists,
pressure is exerted to influence the member to properly
discharge his legal and moral obligation to support the
dependent. The exertion of effort falls just short of
an absolute legal order to pay a sum certain. The re-
sult in most cases is ultimately beneficial to the de-
pendent. The expenditure of man hours for counselling
and investigating, clerical machinery and stationery and
the loss of productive effort of the man being counselled
are probably much more costly to the military organization





The goal is to have the military member take
care of his responsibilities with the least expense to
the military organization. The experience since January
1963 does not warrant a return to the mandatory allot-
ment system in effect prior to that time. By far the
greatest percentage of personnel require no supervi-
sion in their personal affairs. The very small percen-
tage who do require supervision occupy an inordinate
amount of the time of those officers exercising super-
vision, keeping themselves and the officers from pro-
ductive effort in the military mission.
The Secretary of each service now provides
for ascertaining eligibility for allowances, cancella-
tion of allowances when not properly utilised for support
of dependents, and elimination from service of those mem-
bers who dishonorably fail to meet their obligation. The
only factor missing is the authority to effect directly,
what is sought by indirection: establishment of continuing
and adequate support for the dependent.

Legislation, authorizing the establishment
of mandatory allotments in cases where complaints come
to the attention of the command, seems justified. The
unheeded court order or ignored written agreement would
form the basis for the allotment in those cases.
In the case where no court order or written
agreement is involved, the command should still conduct
an initial interview with the member against whom the
complaint is lodged, In many cases this may bring sat-
isfactory results such as arranging a written agreement.
However, regulations should provide that the dependent
should be advised that she must rely on the civil courts
or a written agreement if she wants the assurance of
continuing support which a mandatory allotment provides.
Repeated complaints should be discouraged. The military
organization does not have the adjudicative facilities to
properly determine the issues involved in a complaint of
nonsuoport, nor should such facilities be provided. Ad-
judication of civil responsibility is far removed from
the mission of the military organization.
47

With the addition of the provisions suggested
here, if the state officials act as contemplated by the
act, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
provides ample opportunity to adjudicate a support
claim when the serviceman is within one of the fifty
two jurisdictions which apply the provisions of the act.
Once the court order is obtained, it could form the
basis for a mandatory allotment at any subsequent time
no matter where the serviceman may be.
If nonsupport occurs in the absence of court
order or written agreement when the serviceman is se-
parated from his dependents and on duty in a foreign
country, the remedy immediately available to the depend-
ent, admittedly, would still be inadequate unless a
written agreement were arranged. However, the service-
man is not assigned overseas for an indefinite period.
Normally, if he is not accompanied by dependents, he will be
returned to the United States within two years. The fact
that he has an unresolved nonsupport complaint against
him would be a consideration against allowing him to ex-
tend his overseas assignment.
43

The problem created by conflicting court
orders is essentially a problem between the parties
to the litigation. It should remain so. If a depen-
dent has a court order , which is valid on the face of it,
and the serviceman has a court order of equal apparent
validity, which conflicts with the court order held by
the dependent, the serviceman is advised to have the
matter resolved in court. This practice should continue.
Meantime, if a mandatory allotment were in effect, as
a result of the court order obtained by the dependent,
it should remain in effect. If no allotment had yet
been started, neither of the conflicting orders should
be the basis for a mandatory allotment. The burden
would then be upon the dependent to have the conflict
adjudicated.
The present military approach to nonsupport
problems gives no assurance of continuing and adequate
support. The proposal would leave some dependents in
the same predicament temporarily. However, the proposal
offers the opportunity for an eventual remedy in each case.
The proposed legislation and implementing regulations would
relieve the military organization of a major portion of
49

the administrative burden arising from nonsupport
problems by drastically reducing the number of recurr-
ing complaints. The honorable reputation of the mili-
tary service would be preserved by the provision of an
adequate remedy for the dependent.
50
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